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Analysis of Contract Length and the Timing of Investment”  
 
This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate institutional features of point-source to 
point-source water quality trading (WQT) markets.  The experimental design focuses on the 
contract length of permit trades, the timing of abatement investment decisions, the structure of 
abatement costs, and the way that these features affect trade volume and efficiency.  The findings 
from these experiments are the material to be presented at the 2010 AAEA Joint Annual 
Meeting.  The results from these experiments inform the discussion on why WQT to date has 
failed to produce the anticipated level of trading activity, and come at a time when WQT 
initiatives are being increasingly implemented and supported throughout the U.S.   
Having observed the success of the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading program, policymakers have 
endorsed water quality trading (WQT) in hopes of cost-effectively meeting water pollution 
reduction targets. In 1996, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set forth basic 
guidelines for WQT in the Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading (U.S. EPA, 1996)  
and in 2003 issued its final policy on WQT under the Clean Water Act (U.S. EPA, 2003).  The 
EPA has published numerous training, instructional, and evaluative materials for WQT (U.S. 
EPA, 1998, 2004, 2007, 2008).   For almost 7 years the EPA has funded market-based water 
quality projects through the Targeted Watersheds Grant Program, including allocating up to $3.7 
million to WQT in 2008 (U.S. EPA, 2009a, 2009b).   After more than a decade of EPA support, 
the number of WQT initiatives in the U.S. is increasing substantially, but the majority of these 
initiatives are still realizing only a limited number of trades.  A 2004 report identified more than 
70 WQT programs in some phase of development throughout the U.S., about twice as many as 
there were in 1999 (Breetz, et al., 2004; Environomics, 1999).  Yet according to a recent EPA 
evaluation only 100 facilities have engaged in trade (U.S. EPA, 2009).  It is well known that 
WQT in the U.S. has been mostly unsuccessful, leading numerous authors to speculate as to why 
trades are not occurring (Boisvert, Poe, & Sado, 2007; Farrow, Schultz, Celikkol, & Van 
Houtven, 2005; Hoag & Hughes-Popp, 1997; King, 2005; King & Kuch, 2003; Sado, Boisvert, 
& Poe, Forthcoming) 
One of the postulated reasons for the lack of trade is the non-marginal nature of abatement costs 
that are present in many applications of WQT.  As discussed by Sado et al. (Forthcoming), 
Caplan (2008), Boisvert et al. (2007), and the EPA (1996), the abatement options available to 
sources of water pollution are often restricted to large investments associated with significant 
increases in abatement capabilities.  Furthermore, these investments are often irreversible over a 
short time frame.  Boisvert et al. (2007) and Sado et al. (Forthcoming) argue that these 
circumstances may impinge on the flow of trade in markets with few buyers and sellers such as 
the markets present in many watersheds.  Their logic is that firms that invest in abatement 
technology lack confidence that there will be sufficient demand for their excess permits.  
Likewise, firms that forgo investment have no assurance that there will be a sufficient supply of 
permits for them to meet their abatement allocations.   
Boisvert et al. (2007) suggest that such settings may favor multi-period permit trading contracts 
as opposed single-period contracts.  Furthermore, the present authors hypothesize that the timing 
of abatement investment decisions is critical in the presence of non-marginal abatement costs.  
That is, whether abatement investment decisions are made before or after the negotiation of permit trading contracts will have an effect on those investments and the volume of trade.  It 
remains an open question as to how non-marginal abatement costs actually affect the outcome of 
permit trade in practice, and to what extent contract length and timing alter this outcome.  An 
experimental investigation is conducted to test the influence of non-marginal abatement costs on 
the volume of trade and the efficiency of the permit trading system, and to inform the structuring 
of contract length and timing in WQT markets. 
Although the experimental literature on emission permit trading is vast (see (Bohm, 2003; Muller 
& Mestelman, 1998) for reviews), the majority of these experiments are designed with a focus on 
the SO2 market.  Few experiments have isolated the unique features of WQT markets, and the 
authors are aware of no permit trading experiments that have attempted to capture discrete 
abatement investments, contract length and timing.  To address these issues, we design an 
experiment loosely following the experimental setting of Ben-David, Brookshire, Burness, 
McKee, & Schmidt (1999).  Subjects are given an endowment and an allocation of permits at the 
beginning of each period.  In the baseline seting, subjects first trade perimts by negotating one-
period contracts through a bilateral trading institution, and then make abatement investment 
decisions.  Subjects may not make abatement decisions that are non-compliant: the smallest 
amount of abatement that a subject may undertake is that which meets the abatement 
requirement, given permit holdings.  At the end of each period, subjects receive a payoff equal to 
their endowment plus the gains from trade less abatement costs. The decision to implement a 
bilateral trading instiution is motivated by observations in the literature.  Boisvert et al. (2007) 
suggest that settings with non-marginal abatement costs may benefit from bilateral negotiations 
as opposed to open market exchange.  In a separate analysis Sado et al. (Forthcoming) 
corroborate this suggestion with simulations of phosphorus emissions trading in the non-tidal 
Passaic River Watershed.  Woodward and Kaiser similarly note that bilateral negotiations have 
characterized most WQT markets to date and that they expect this to continue (2002).  The 
experiment implements three treatment variables following a 2x2x2 design: 1) The timing of the 
abatement investment decision indicates whether the abatement decision occurs before or after 
the negotiation of contracts; 2) The contract length is effective for either one or two periods; 3) 
The abatement cost structure is either continuous or discrete. 
This research should appeal to those working in the area of water quality management as well as 
those interested in trading experiments, and the authors believe it has the potential to generate 
substantial discussion at the meeting.  The paper addresses an important policy question, the 
relevance of which is most evident in the amount of support that the EPA has devoted to WQT 
over the past ten years and the subsequent flourish of speculation over its failure in practice.  The 
reasons why WQT programs are not working remain unknown.  This paper is the first to 
systematically address the issues of non-marginal abatement costs, contract length and contract 
timing, features that are hypothesized to be key elements in WQT and potentially contribute to 
its success or failure in practice.   
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